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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No.  08-2222 
____________ 
 
BETTY HIXSON 
(Survivor of and o/b/o DEMPSEY HIXSON), 
 
                                                    Petitioners 
v. 
 
DIRECTOR OWCP, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR; 
U.S. STEEL MINING COMPANY, 
 
                                                       Respondents 
____________ 
 
On Petition for Review from an 
Order of the Benefits Review Board, 
United States Department of Labor 
(Benefits Review Board No. 07-0471) 
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
October 19, 2010 
 
Before:  HARDIMAN, GREENAWAY, JR. and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: November 10, 2010) 
 
____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
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HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 Betty Hixson (Hixson), widow of Dempsey Hixson (Dempsey), filed a petition for 
review of the Black Lung Benefits Review Board denying her claim for benefits under  
30 U.S.C. § 921(a).  We will deny the petition. 
I. 
 Because we write solely for the parties, we narrate only those portions of the facts 
and procedural history that are necessary to our decision.  The Black Lung Benefits Act 
(Act), 30 U.S.C. § 901 et seq., and its implementing regulations impose upon certain coal 
mine operators liability for the total disability or death of workers in the operators’ mines 
if the disability or death was caused by pneumoconiosis (a lung disease) arising out of 
coal mine employment.  See 30 U.S.C. § 921(a); 20 C.F.R. §§ 718.204 (total disability), 
718.205 (death). 
 Dempsey Hixson, a coal miner for over 20 years, smoked cigarettes regularly for 
much of his life.  Dempsey retired from mining in 1983, suffered various pulmonary and 
respiratory difficulties that increased in severity with time, and ultimately died from 
pneumonia in 2001. 
 Dempsey filed multiple applications for benefits under the Act.  In his final 
application, after protracted proceedings before multiple Administrative Law Judges 
(ALJs) and the Benefits Review Board, Dempsey was ultimately found to be suffering 
from pneumoconiosis arising from coal mining and to be totally disabled.  Nevertheless, 
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the Board denied benefits based on a lack of proof that Dempsey’s total disability was 
caused by the pneumoconiosis.  Dempsey filed a number of motions for modification, 
some of them including additional evidence.  Before his last motion could be heard, 
Dempsey died, and Hixson added a survivor’s claim. 
 Because the previous medical evidence had established Dempsey’s 
pneumoconiosis, U.S. Steel conceded that he had suffered from the disease and that it 
arose out of coal mine employment, but maintained that his disability and death were not 
caused by it.  U.S. Steel offered the expert opinion of Dr. Everett Oesterling, a board-
certified clinical pathologist, who opined that Dempsey’s pneumoconiosis was too minor 
in nature to have caused either his disability or his death.  Oesterling instead pointed to 
Dempsey’s cigarette smoking and asthma as the causal agents behind his pulmonary and 
respiratory problems.1  The ALJ found Dr. Oesterling’s opinion to be persuasive and in 
accord with the weight of the medical evidence adduced in prior proceedings.  
Accordingly, the ALJ denied the motion for modification.  Hixson appealed to the Board, 
which affirmed. 
 
                                                          
 1
 We recognize that the record contains other medical evidence and that, in 
considering a motion for modification, an ALJ must consider all of the evidence, 
including that adduced in prior proceedings.  See Nataloni v. Director, Officer of 
Worker’s Comp. Programs, 17 B.L.R. 1-82 (1993).  We here address only Dr. 
Oesterling’s opinions because Hixson limits her competence objections to those opinions 
and does not lodge any complaint with respect to the ALJ’s weighing of the remaining 
evidence. 
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II. 
 Hixson now petitions for review of the denial of the motion for modification.2  An 
order denying benefits can be modified “on grounds of a change in conditions or because 
of a mistake in a [previous] determination of fact.”  20 C.F.R. § 725.310(a).  In reviewing 
an ALJ’s decision with respect to benefits: 
[t]he Board is bound by the ALJ’s findings of fact if they are supported by 
substantial evidence. Our review of the Board’s decision is limited to a 
determination of whether an error of law has been committed and whether the 
Board has adhered to its scope of review. 
 
 In reviewing the Board’s decision, we must independently review the 
record and decide whether the ALJ’s findings are rational, consistent with 
applicable law and supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a 
whole. Substantial evidence has been defined as “such relevant evidence as a 
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” We exercise 
plenary review over the ALJ’s legal conclusions that were adopted by the Board. 
 
Hill v. Dir., Office of Worker’s Comp. Programs, 562 F.3d 264, 268 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(citations and some internal quotation marks omitted). 
 For the reasons that follow, we will deny the petition. 
III. 
 Hixson first assails the Board’s affirmance of the ALJ’s conclusion that she failed 
to prove that Dempsey’s total disability was due to his pneumoconiosis.  She does so by 
maintaining that U.S. Steel’s admission that Dempsey suffered from pneumoconiosis 
                                                          
 2
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 921(c). 
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arising from his coal mine employment eliminated the requirement that she make any 
showing of causation. 
 20 C.F.R. § 718.204(c)(1) provides that, in order to establish that her husband was 
“totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis,” Hixson must demonstrate that the disease 
either had “a material adverse effect on [his] respiratory or pulmonary condition,” id. 
§18.204(c)(1)(I), or “[m]aterially worsen[ed]” some other “totally disabling respiratory or 
pulmonary impairment.”  Hixson’s argument relies on the regulatory definition of 
“pneumoconiosis” found at 20 C.F.R. § 718.201, which reads: 
(a) For the purpose of the Act, “pneumoconiosis” means a chronic dust 
disease of the lung and its sequelae, including respiratory and pulmonary 
impairments, arising out of coal mine employment. This definition includes 
both medical, or “clinical”, pneumoconiosis and statutory, or “legal”, 
pneumoconiosis. 
 . . . . 
(b) For purposes of this section, a disease “arising out of coal mine 
employment” includes any chronic pulmonary disease or respiratory or 
pulmonary impairment significantly related to, or substantially aggravated 
by, dust exposure in coal mine employment. 
 
Hixson maintains that the phrase “substantially aggravated by[] dust exposure in coal 
mine employment,” as used in this regulatory definition of pneumoconiosis, is 
substantively identical to § 718.204(c)(1)(i)’s causation requirement of a “materially 
adverse effect on the miner’s respiratory or pulmonary condition.”  Under Hixson’s 
theory, U.S. Steel’s admission that her husband had pneumoconiosis arising out of coal 
mine employment absolves her from submitting further proof of causation. 
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 The Board rejected this argument, citing multiple authorities for the proposition 
that causation is an element of a benefits claimant’s case distinct from the existence of 
pneumoconiosis.  We agree.  If § 718.201(b) provided that an illness can be regarded as 
pneumoconiosis only if it is “substantially aggravated” by such employment, Hixson’s 
argument might have some merit.  But § 718.201(b) expressly states that a lung ailment 
can also qualify as pneumoconiosis simply by being “significantly related to” mine 
employment.  We think it abundantly clear that this “significantly related” standard can 
be satisfied even in cases where the illness does not create any material adverse effects on 
the miner’s health, within the meaning of § 718.204(c)(1).  Accordingly, an admission 
that a miner has pneumoconiosis is not equivalent to an admission that the illness caused 
any total disability the miner may have suffered, and we will affirm the Board’s decision 
in this regard. 
IV. 
 Hixson also argues that the testimony of Dr. Oesterling, U.S. Steel’s expert, was 
incompetent because it contradicted the fundamental premises of the statutory and 
regulatory regime: 
The Act and its implementing regulations provide compensation and other 
benefits . . . to miners’ surviving dependents where death is due to 
pneumoconiosis. For purposes of the Act, death is considered due to 
pneumoconiosis if the disease was a “substantially contributing cause or 
factor” leading to death. 20 C.F.R. §718.205(c). This term has been held to 
encompass situations in which pneumoconiosis “actually hastened” the 
miner’s death. 
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Consol. Coal Co. v. Kramer, 305 F.3d 203, 205 (3d Cir. 2002).  Thus, it is axiomatic to 
this remedial scheme that pneumoconiosis is indeed capable of hastening death.  We have 
held that ALJs may disregard as incompetent expert opinion evidence that contradicts 
fundamental tenets of this sort.  Id. at 210. 
 Hixson, however, overstates the import of the regulatory scheme at issue here.  
She states that “[u]nder the Rules as promulgated by the Director, one cannot have de 
minimis pneumoconiosis,” Pet. Br. at 29 n.3, implying that every case of the illness 
necessarily hastens death, thus invalidating any evidence that a given individual’s death 
was not caused by it.  This is plainly wrong.  The regulations indicate only that it is 
possible for pneumoconiosis to hasten death, not that it always does so.  And, as the 
Board noted, Dr. Oesterling’s testimony in this regard was not at all in tension with the 
regulations.  Oesterling simply opined that pneumoconiosis did not hasten Dempsey’s 
death, not that it was incapable of hastening anyone’s death.  Accordingly, the Board did 
not err in affirming the ALJ’s consideration of Oesterling’s testimony. 
V. 
 For the reasons stated, we find no legal error in the Board’s conclusions and 
substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s findings of fact.  Accordingly, we will deny 
Hixson’s petition for review. 
